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Psychology, Society and the Development
of the Adversarial Posture
JOHN J. DIEFFENBACH*
Solving a problem in a way that benefits both sides is such a logical
and rational c6ncept that one wonders why academics have to teach it and
lawyers and business'people have to learn it. Why has such a simple idea
been so long in coming into use in the legal profession, and so many
lawyers still resist?
Psychological studies of American children suggest that the notion of
creating a cooperative "win-win" situation is hard to accept in the United
States because competition is so firmly rooted in our culture and our
cognitive development. These studies reveal- that given the choice between
cooperation for mutual gain or competition resulting in no gain, American
children prefer to compete. in fact, the competitive nature of some of
these children is so high that some are likely to try to reduce another's
gain if they themselves cannot succeed.
Part I of this Article reviews the findings from psychological studies
about what American children do, compared to children of other cultures,
to resolve conflict. Part II discusses why the cognitive orientation of
American lawyers may present a barrier to appreciating the value of a
cooperative solution. Part III describes how the social environment alters
that orientation in rural legal practice, in which cooperative settlements are
the norm. Part IV suggests several forces which may further the use of
cooperative settlements in the legal profession. Finally, this Article
concludes that American lawyers need more training in alternative means
of solving disputes to benefit society, enhance public perception of the bar,
and to stay in business.
I. NURTURING ToMoRiW's LAWYERS
In 1967, Millard C. Madsen, of the University of California, Los
Angeles, began a series of psychological experiments' to supplement
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1. Millard C. Madsen, Cooperative and Competitive Moiivation of Children in Three
Mexican Subcultures, 20 PSYCHOL. REP. 1307 (1967).
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earlier anthropological studies' on child-rearing in different Mexican
cultures. Those earlier studies showed rural Mexican families raised their
children not to fight back when attacked and punished their children for
aggressive behavior. When the rural children reached school age and
interacted with children from an urban setting, the rural children could not
stand up for themselves because they could not adjust to the aggressive
nature of these new classmates.
Madsen compared the problem-solving abilities of Mexican children
from a rural village and children from a middle-class urban school. The
children were required to solve problems through cooperative behavior
when competition minimized reward and when it maximized reward.' The
results showed rural Mexican children would adopt a cooperative posture
even when competition would maximize individual gain. The urban
Mexican children would cooperate when gain was distributed evenly to the
group. But when individual achievement was suggested, they would
compete even if continuing to cooperate would be more beneficial.
Working with other researchers, Madsen conducted similar tests4
comparing the rural Mexicans with children in the United States and
comparing urban Israeli children with those raised on a kibbutz.' The
studies consistently demonstrated that children from backgrounds which
required cooperative behavior for survival, such as an agricultural
community, worked together for group gain even when individual gain
might be greater. Children from urban and middle-class backgrounds,
regardless of race or nationality, would cooperate when cued to do so. But
if the researcher suggested competition and individual achievement, urban
and middle-class children would compete irrationally, even to the point of
2. OSCAR LEWIS, LIFE IN A MEXICAN VILLAGE: TEPOZTLAN RESTUDIED (1961);
KIMBALL ROMNEY & ROMA E. ROMNEY, The Mixtecans of Juxilahuaca, Mexico, in Six
CULTURES 541 (Beatrice B. Whitney ed., 1963).
3. Children from low income urban backgrounds were also part of the study, but they
were represented only by girls and were a much smaller number than the other two groups.
Because of the inadequate representation, Madsen concentrated on the rural and middle-
income children in his analysis. Madsen, supra note 1, at 1308-09.
4. Ariella Shapira & Millard C. Madsen, Cooperative and Competitive Behavior of
Kibbutz and Urban Children in Israel, 40 CHILD DEv. 609 (1969); Millard C. Madsen &
Ariella Shapira, Cooperative and Competitive Behavior of Urban Afro-American, Anglo-
American, Mexican-American and Mexican Village Children, 3 DEv. PSYCHOL. 16 (1970);
Spencer Kagan & Millard C. Madsen, Cooperation and Competition of Mexican, Mexican-
American and Anglo-American Children of Two Ages Under Four Instructional Sets, 5 DEv.
PSYCHOL. 32 (1971).,
5. A kibbutz is an Israeli communal farm or settlement on which generosity and
cooperation are rewarded and selfishness and failure to cooperate are punished. See generally
A.I. RABIN, GROWING UP IN THE KIBBUTZ 5-8 (1965). One study found kibbutz children
accept cooperative behavior as a socially desirable norm and dislike those who try to excel
over other members of the group. The study said some students are actually ashamed of
being at the top of their class. MELFORD E. SHAPIRO, CHILDREN OF THE KIBBUTZ 404
(1965).
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forfeiting any gain.6
Madsen's studies7 focused on culturally homogenous groups of
children between the ages of 7 and 11.' The researchers never mixed the
various groups of Israelis, Mexicans, Anglo-Americans, Mexican-
Americans and African-Americans for interaction.
Madsen developed the "cooperation board" (Figure 1). for the
testing. One child sat at each comer of an eighteen-inch square board. In
the center of the board was a weighted pen attached to four strings. The
four strings ran through eyelets at each comer of the board, allowing the
children to pull and move the pen across the board. A sheet of paper on
the board recorded the pen's movements when the children pulled on the
strings. Madsen numbered four circles one through four and pasted one on
the paper between each child. The effect of having the circles between
each child rather than directly in front of them was to force the children to
cooperate in order to draw the pen across the circle.
6. Subsequent research by psychologists among European, Korean, Columbian, East
African, and Polynesian children supports Madsen's original findings. See generally Marida
Hollos, Collective Education in Huhgary: The Development of Competitive, Cooperative, and
Role-taking Behaviors, 8 ETHOS 3 (1980) (studying Hungarian children ages 6-8); Millard C.
Madsen & Sunin Yi, Cooperation and Competition of Urban and Rural Children in the
Republic of South Korea, 10 INT'L J. PSYCHOL. 269 (1975) (studying South Korean children
ages 8-9); Gerardo Marin and Beatriz Mejia, Cooperation as a Function of Place of
Residence in Columbian Children, 95 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 127,(1975) (studying first grade
Columbian children); Robert L. Munroe & Ruth H. Munroe, Cooperation and Competition
Among East African and American Children, 101 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 145 (1977) (comparing
children ages 5-10 from Kenya with same aged suburban children from the United States);
David R. Thomas, Cooperation and Competition Among Polynesian and European Children,
46 CHILD DEV. 948 (1976) (studying groups of children ages 7-8, 9-10, and 11-12 from
three different Polynesian islands).
7. Madsen, 'supra note 1, at 1308-09; Ariella Shapira & Millard C. Madsen,
Cooperative and Competitive Behavibr of Kibbutz and Urban Children in Israel, 40 CHILD
DEv. 609 (1969); Millard C. Madsen & Ariella Shapira, Cooperative and Competitive
Behavior of Urban Afro-American, Anglo-American, Mexican-American and Mexican Village
Children, 3 DEv. PSYCHOL. 16 (1970); Midsen, supra note 4.
8. Two of the studies also involved groups of 4 and 5 year-olds who proved to be more
cooperative than their older counterparts. This may be a function of the cognitive
development of these children in that they have not reached a stage where they distinguish
individual goal orientation to make them compete. See Kagan & Madsen, supra note 4, at 37.
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FIGURE 19
(S1-S4=position of each of the four children.)
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After the children learned how to manipulate the pen, they were told
to move the pen so it crossed the four circles, in numerical order, as many
times as possible in one minute. Every time they completed a round the
children would each get a piece of candy. Thus, in order for any
individual child to get a piece of candy the four children had to work
together to get the pen around the board. The children had several chances
to improve their performance. They had an equal number of trials as a
group and as individuals.."
After the fifth trial each child's name was written on a circle. The
children were then told they would each get a piece of candy for every
time the pen crossed the circle with their own name. They then underwent
another set of five one-minute trials.
To maximize individual gain in trials six through ten, the children
should have continued to cooperate as before, because no one child could
reach her" circle without the help of the others. By working together
they could draw the pen across their own circles and each other's several
times before time expired.
9. Reproduced with permission of the Estate of author and publisher from Millard C.
Madsen, Cooperative and Competitive Motivation of Children in Three Mexican Subcultures,
20 PSYCHOL. REP. 1307, 1312 (1967).
10. The actual number of trials the children underwent in the four studies cited varied
between six and ten, supra note 6.
11. Madsen notes that although the results varied slightly between boys and girls, these
distinctions were statistically insignificant. He does suggest that the urban Mexican boys'
higher rate of success in cooperative situations may be due to their greater participation in
team sports. See Madsen, supra note I, at 1316-19. Because the distinction is immaterial for
this paper, however, both male and female pronouns are used in the discussion.
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The studies showed that by the end of the first five group-oriented
trials the urban and middle-class Mexican and American children' had
surpassed the rural Mexican children in their ability to acquire the
candy.13 But on the sixth trial, when the individual element was
introduced, the success of all the urban and middle-class, children dropped
drastically, as they competed to draw lines over their own circles. Their
rural counterparts showed only slightly less, and sometimes even greater,
success than on trial five. Madsen suggests that the rural groups, which
scored slightly lower in the first five trials, did not begin to compete
individually in trial six as the urban children did. Instead, they slowed
down in an effort to avoid competition. By the end of the tenth trial the
urban and middle-class children were still well below the rate of their
cooperative fifth trial. The rural children, however, showed a steadily
increasing success rate through the end of the tenth trial. The results of
one of the urban middle-class groups of Mexican children (Figure 2)
vividly illustrate the breakdown in cooperation.
The second experiment involving the cooperation board analyzed
how the children behaved when c6mpetition rationally appeared to
maximize reward even though cooperation produced greater actual gain.
12. The same trends in competitive versus cooperative results were found in all three
American subcultures, though the Mexican-American children were slightly less competitive
than the Afro-American and Anglo-American children. Nevertheless, Madsen and Shapira did
not find any statistically significant differences among the three American groups. See
Millard C. Madsen & Ariella Shapira, Cooperative and Competitive Behavior of Uiban Afro-
American, Anglo-American, Mexican-American and Mexican Village Children, 3 DEV.
PSYCHOL. 16, 17 (1970).
13. The kibbutz children actually did better than their urban Israeli counterparts during
the cooperative stage, perhaps because the four kibbutz children were always from the same
kvatza, a subgroup within the kibbutz that works, cats, and sleeps together every day. See
Ariella Shapira & Millard C. Madsen, Cooperative and Competitive Behavior of Kibbutz and
Urban Children in Israel, 40 CHILD DEv. 609, 614 (1969). The rural Mexican children, on
the other hand, simply came from the same small village and may have been a little slower
becoming familiar with one another during the cooperation phase. See Madsen, sapra note 1,
at 1308.
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Madsen moved the circles to the comers of the board, 'directly in
front of each of the children. Thus, a child pulling the string would bring
the pen across his circle. Whoever pulled the pen to his comer in the one-
minute time limit would get a piece of candy. Under these circumstances,
successful competition appeared to be the best strategy to get candy. The
children were also told in advance that they would have four trials, leaving
an unexpressed option for one piece of candy per child, if they cooperated,
or as many as all four to one highly competitive child.
This change in the design of the experiment showed that the
Mexican village children could be aggressive about getting the candy, but
the more typical reaction was for two children to pull simultaneously,
creating a deadlock. At this point, one child would let go and let the other
calmly pull the pen toward himself. At no point was there confrontation,
and in some cases the children did work out an- equal division of the four
possible rewards.
The level of competition among the urban Mexican children, on the
other hand, is better told in anecdotes than statistics:
The extreme competitiveness of the urban middle-class sample was
attested to by the fact that on seven occasions these children broke
50-lb. test lines by pulling against each other in an attempt to win a
piece of candy .... It appears that the motivation of the rural . , .
children was to avoid direct conflict, while the urban middle cla~s
children did not appear to mind and even seemed to enjoy conflict.
This was illustrated by one boy who was pulling as hard as he could
with one hand while flipping some of his accumulated candy [with
the other] to a janitor who happened to be passing .... It was the
winning and not that candy that inattered.1
Madsen also points out that the most frequently heard phrase among
the urban middle-class Mexican children was para mi (for me) while
among the rural children it was para tu (for you). 6
Among the American children, the story was no different.
Comipetition for individual prizes often became violent, and the researcher
frequently had to hold the board down to keep it from flying through the
air.17
The often aggressive, wild shouting matches among the children in
the United States, who were desperately but unsuccessfully trying to
cross their circles, was in contrast to the rather slow, quiet, and
15. Madsen, supra note 1, at 1316, 1318.
16. Id. at 1318.
17. Millard C. Madsen & Ariella Shapira, Competitive & Cooperative Behavior of
Urban Afro-American, Anglo-American, Mexican American and Mexican Villtige Children, 3
DEy. PSYCHOL. 16, 19 (1970).
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deliberately cooperative behavior of the Mexican village children. It
should be noted, however, that urban children in Mexico (Madsen,
1967) performed on the cooperation board in much the same manner
as the competitive groups in the United States.'
1
These studies suggest that children in the United States will, to
paraphrase Madsen, compete irrationally when cooperation is the rational
solution. While not making any conclusive findings, Madsen suggests the
children's reactions are products of a non-agricultural and achievement-
oriented environment where "winning" is the goal. Further experimental
comparisons between Mexican village children and American children
suggested "winning" means different things to these two groups.
A comparison of Mexican village children and Anglo-American
children from' the Los Angeles area,19 sought to refine the cooperative
and competitive natures of both groups by eliminating a choice through
three experiments.' '
Experiment 1: The children were given a cooperation box, which
was essentially a small toy chest with four spring locks (Figure 3). In
order to open the box so the two children could get to the toys inside, both
children had to simultaneously pull back the four latches and lift the lid.
The children first practiced on a training box with only two latches to
make sure they understood the mechanism.
1&. Id. at 20.
19. Spencer Kagan & Millard C. Madsen, Experimental Analyses of Cooperation and
Competition of Anglo-American and Mexican Children, 6 DEv. PSYCHOL. 49 (1972).
20. A fourth experiment in the study is omitted from this discussion.
[Vol. 7:2 1992]
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FIGURE 321
(Top, training box with two latches; bottom, cooperation box with four
latches.)
The children faced two situations, one in which their cooperation
would result in a toy for each of them, and one in which helping a partner
would result in a toy for that partner. The study found no significant
difference in the Anglo-Americans' or the rural Mexicans' willingness to
cooperate for mutual gain or to help for another's gain. The willingness of
both groups to cooperate for mutual gain is not a surprise in light of the
earlier experiments with the cooperation board. The willingness of the
American children to help their partner, however, adds a new dimension
to the Anglo-American children's ability to cooperate altruistically.
Experiment 2: This test utilized a board with circles running seven
across by seven down (Figure 4). No diagonal movement was permitted.
21. Copyright 1972 by the American Psychological Association. Spencer Kagan &
Millard C. Madsen, Experimental Analyses of Cooperation and Competition of Anglo-"
American and Mexican Children, 6 DEv. PSYCHOL. 49, 50 (photo reprinted with permission
of the Estate of Millard C. Madsen and the publisher from 6 DEV. PSYCHOL.) (197.2).
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FIGURE 4
(A4=Child A; G4=Child B; D4=Marker starting point.)
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One child was seated at one end of the table and another child across
from her. The tester gave Child A a toy, such as a magnifying glass or
whistle, and told Child A it was hers. The tester then asked Child A to lay
the toy down next to the board.
A marker was placed in the center of the grid of circles (D4). The
tester told. Child B she could move the marker six times. If the child
moved the marker to the circle in front of Child A (A4), Child B could
take Child A's toy. If, however, Child B moved the marker to the circle in
front of herself (G4), she was told Child A would get to keep the toy.
Child B also had the unexpressed option to move the marker to neither of
those two circles, thus avoiding any decision. To cover the distance from
the center of the board to Child A, Child B needs only three moves. So
Child B had more than enough moves to reach either goal. This first test
was called the "competition condition."
A second group of children received different instructions. If Child
B moved the marker to Child A's circle, Child A would still lose the toy,
but no one would get it. If Child B brought the marker to his circle, Child
22. Copyright 1971 by the American Psychological Association. Spencer Kagan &
Millard C. Madsen, Cooperation and Competition of Mexkan, Mexican-American, and
Anglo-American Children of Two Ages Under Four Instructional Sets, 5 DEv. PSYCHOL. 32,
33 (photo reprinted with permission of the Estate of Millard C. Madsen and the publisher
from 5 DEV. PSYCHOL. 32) (1971).
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A would keep the toy. Again, Child B could do neither, leaving the toy
where it was. This was called the "rivalry condition."
The two tests compared a child's desire to take the toy from another
for himself (competition condition) with a child's desire to deprive another
of a toy he can not have (rivalry condition).
In the competition condition, the results indicated the American
childien were more likely to take the toy (92 percent) than the rural
Mexican children (77 percent). That, in turn, made them less likely to
affirmatively let Child A keep the toy by returning to their circle (5
percent compared to 14 percent) and less likely to avoid the problem (3
percent compared to 9 percent).
In the rivalry condition, however, the American children deprived
the other child of the toy more than twice as often as the rural Mexican
children (78 percent compared to 36 percent). The rural Mexican children
were more likely to affirmatively let the child keep the toy by returning to
their circle (42 percent compared to 14 percent) or avoid a. decision (22
percent compared to 8 percent). Kagan and Madsen point out the low level
of avoidance among the American children in both situations "suggests that
they experienced little conflict in moving to separate another child from
his toy."'
Experiment 3: In the final test the children used the -same board, but
this time with two markers, starting at points A4 and G4. The children
alternated turns, and the first child to reach the other child's starting point
within twenty-four moves would win a "toy. 'Of course, as soon as the
children began moving straight across. the board they ran right into each
other. Because they could not occupy the same space at the same time and
could not move diagonally, one -child had to "step aside" to let the other
go past to win the toy. Or, the child could say "pass" on her turn and hold
the position. Both children were told they would play eight rounds, so
there was the unexpressed possibility of alternating winning the toy.
Of the sixteen pairs of American children and sixteen pairs of rural
Mexican children, all of the Americans ran into a blockade compared to
only five pairs of rural Mexicans. Yet, of those five pairs of rural
Mexicans, the blockades never lasted longer than two turns while ten of
the American pairs averaged more than that.
Eleven rural Mexican pairs split the toys evenly while only two
American pairs reached this goal. Twelve of the sixteen American pairs
upheld the blockade at least once by passing their turns so that neither got
the toy; seven pairs of the sixteen lost more than one toy for a total loss of
twenty-two toys. Not one rural Mexican pair lost a toy by blocking.
23. Kagan & Madsen, supra note 19, at 54.
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
In this experiment Anglo-American pairs tended to remain in conflict
even when to .do so prevented them from getting as many toys as
possible. The number of trials in which neither child obtained a toy
may be seen as a measure of the pair's inability to avoid conflict
when to do so is in their interest. Given this measure, Anglo-
American children are significantly more irrational than Mexican
children. The Mexican children, however, tend to move aside even in
the cases when to do so is irrational in terms of their individual
interest. . . .Given this measure, Mexican children are irrationally
avoidant. The blocked Mexican child appeared to move aside
automatically. In two Mexican pairs, both children moved aside even
though it was necessary for only one to do so.24
From this series of experiments we see the extremes of competition
and non-competition. At one end the rural Mexican children would rather
not compete and would sacrifice any gain if confrontation is involved. As
Kagan and Madsen point out, such behavior against self-interest is
irrational. At some point one must make a move to reach a goal if one
wants to achieve anything.
Kagan and Madsen's definition of "self-interest" is suspect,
however. As Eve Hill points out,' male-oriented criteria are not
absolute. For instance, what if a child's "self-interest" was not to
accumulate toys, but to please another child? Unless Kagan and Madsen
can show that at this stage of cognitive development every child's self-
interest includes increasing material possessions, their argument about
what is "rational" or "irrational" among extremely cooperative cultures is
flawed. A child from such a background might have more self-interest in
maintaining harmony among her peers than getting a magnifying glass or
whistle.'
The American children, however, would rather hold onto the string
on the cooperation board, keep their marker blocking another child's
marker or, in the rivalry condition of Experiment 2, take another child's
toy even though it benefits no one. Kagan and Madsen note, "[T]he fact
that almost all Anglo-American children find it reinforcing to lower the
outcome of their peers, throws into question the quality of peer interaction
in the Anglo-American culture."21 "Winning" in Experiment 2 meant
reducing the other child's gain, or what Kagan and Madsen call "relative
24. Id. at 57-58.
25. Eve Hill, Alternative Dispute Resolution in a Feminist Voice, 5 OHIO ST. J. DisP.
RESOL. 337, 338 (1990).
26. For another example of such "irrational" behavior, see infra note 57 and
accompanying text.
27. Kagan & Madsen. supra note 19, at 58.
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gain" as opposed to "absolute gain."'
If American children develop in this combative manner, it is not
surprising that American lawyers and businesspeople need to be retrained
28. At least one other study, Millard C. Madsen, Developmental and Cross-Cultural
Differences in the Cooperative and Competitive Behavior of Young Children, 2 J. CROSS-
CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 365 (1971), shows the overpowering sense of "winning" among
American children. Two children were seated at either end of a long, narrow table. In front
of them were small holes with cups under them (Figure 5). The children were each given a
string attached to an doughnut-shaped container with a marble inside.
(Copyright 1971 by the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology. Millard C.
Madsen, Developmental and Cross-Cultural Differences in the Cooperative and Competitive
Behavior of Young Children, 2 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 365, 367 (photo reprinted
with permission of the Estate of Millard C. Madsen and Sage Publications, Inc. from 2 J.
CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. (1971)).
The children could pull the container toward them and let the marble drop into their
cup. But if the other child pulled at the same time, the container, held together by magnets,
would break apart and the marble would roll off the table so no one got it. The children had
ten trials to get the marble, after which the tester showed them how cooperation would result
in five marbles each. Then the children had another ten trials. Madsen reports that the
competition among the American children was so high that even after the children told each
other they should take turns and received a demonstration to that effect, they still competed.
Id. at 369. Madsen says it is obvious the children were not trying to "get" the marbles but
wanted to "win" the marbles. Id.
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to find more efficient and productive ways to settle disputes.
II. BARRIERS TO ALTERING CONFLICT ORIENTATION
Motivations influence the actions of American attorneys. In the
practice of law, motivations may take the form of financial incentives,
peer acceptance or satisfaction from a job well done.' An individual
attorney's motivations and perceptions about winning are initially shaped
by parents3 ° and teachers.31 In order to alter the attorney's perception of
29. In many of his studies Madsen found the competitive quality in children increased
with age. See Madsen, supra note 28, at 369. Couple that with the emphasis on achievement
American mothers exhibited, infra note 30, and then consider the methods used in American
legal education:
The training of thinking in law school is pervasively a unidimensional
process with fringe consideration of methods, other than the dialectical case
method, of organizing and interpreting experience. It essentially fits and suits
the operative juridical system though it may be prejudicial in the way it
operates in other contexts, such as the law office practice. The thinking style
is incisive but narrow. It encourages focused decision, but does not encourage
open minded inquiry. . . . It is inimical to dimensions of experience that are
"unruly" or irrational, and hence can display no deference toward or
consideration of emotional or partly formed experience. It is indifferent to
moral expression. It cannot regard single or personal events with adequate
individualized concern and consideration. It is, in sum, a sharply honed
method that tends to characterize its practitioner, the lawyer, as a person with
practiced technique in a certain style of analysis but not much else.
The. cultivation of narrow gauged, unidimensional thinking capacity
enjoys a remarkable degree of acceptance in legal pedagogy. Llewellyn, in a
short book explicating the teaching and learning process in law, said: "The
hardest job of the first year is to lop off your common sense, to knock your
ethics into temporary anesthesia. Your view of social policy, your sense of
justice - to knock them out of you along with woozy thinking, along with
ideas all fuzzed along their edges." It apparently did not occur to Llewellyn,
as it may not occur to others, to question whether such pain in learning and
sacrifice in humane values, even as a temporary expedient, is necessary to the
teaching of thinking. If, in fact, legal education did all that Llewellyn
proposed, would it not be a disaster? Are there not alternative ways of
thinking in relation to law and alternative modes in teaching and learning
thinking?
Robert S. Redmount, Law Learning, Teacher-Student Relations, and the Legal Profession, 59
WASH. U. L.Q. 853 at 872-73 (1981) (citing KARL LLEwELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1930)
(italics in original)).
30. Madsen and Kagan found a great disparity in the way mothers reward their children
for their successes and failures. In their study, the children were told to throw a beanbag at a
row of squares that got progressively further away. The American mothers would only give
their child a reward when the child succeeded in hitting the target. A failure earned the child
a word of encouragement. Mothers from a rural Mexican town, however, rewarded effort,
whether it resulted in success or failure. In addition, American mothers would not let their
children drop backward to an easier target (throwing a beanbag at a closer square) because
the child had hit that goal and had to go on to a higher one. The rural Mexican mothers
frequently let their children go back to an earlier square if the higher goal became too
difficult. American mothers, however, rewarded success more richly than did rural Mexican
mothers. Millard C. Madsen & Spencer Kagan, Mother Directed Achievement of Children in
Two Cultures, 4 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 221 (1973).
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"winning" one must not only teach an alternative, but provide a motivation
to practice it.32
Such a motivation may be hard to develop. By the time an
individual becomes a practicing attorney he or she is aiready oriented
toward some method of settling disputes that comes from a lifetime of
development and reinforcement. The legal profession has always been
slow to make change. A study by Lawrence J. Landwehr suggests that the
problem may be both an institutional and individual one.'
Landwehr conducted a survey of randodily chosen lawyers in New
York, California, and Wisconsin using a technique developed by
psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg. Kohlberg's theory is that individuals
develop along a psychological continuum of six advancing stages.'
Landwehr sent questionnaires to the attorneys using two of
Kohlberg's ethical dilemmas. The way in which the lawyers responded to
the questions indicated what stage they had reached.' Of the 195 lawyers
who responded, 90.3 percent displayed what Kohlberg calls "the law and
order orientation." This orientation is Stage Four, in which there is, "...
orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social
order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for
authority, and *maintaining the given social order, for its own sake. "36
This stage indicates lawyers do not think about revising the law, but
merely work within its boundaries and principles.37 Law and order
oriented people will not change from a competitive posture to a
cooperative one for the good of the law or society because they fail to
recognize when the system is not functioning as it was designed to
function.
*The concept of change for the good of a larger body is.complicated
in the legal setting because there are so many "larger bodies" to consider.
For example, consider a law school .classroom exercise in
competitive/cooperative behavior. The scenario is based on the classic
Prisoner's Dilemma in which two people (A and B) are being coerced to
31. Madsen illustrates the attitudes of urban Mexican teachers through one teacher who,
while observing some highly competitive behavior during a testing session, exclaimed, "Ah,
that is the new spirit of Mexico." Madsen, supra note 1, at 1319.
32. As Madsen has shown, teaching the method is not always effective in getting
children to practice it because of the overpowering desire to "win." See supra note 28.
33. See Lawrence J. Landwehr, Lawyers as Social Progressives or Reactionaries: The
Law and Order Cognitive Orientation of Lawyers, 7 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 39 (1982).
34. Id. at 40 n.2 (citing LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE COGNITIvE-DEVELOPMENTAL
APPROACH TO MORAL EDUCATION, 50-51 (1978)).
35. See Landwehr, supra note 33, at 43-44.
36. Id. at 40 n.2.
37. Landwehr contrasted the results of the lawyers with that of the general public, where
typically 30 to 50 percent are concentrated at Stage Four and the rest are spread across
Stages Two through Six. Id. at 44-46.
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confess to a crime. If A and B both remain silent, they cannot be
prosecuted. But A is told if she confesses she will go free and B will be
prosecuted based on A's evidence. If both confess, however, they will
both be prosecuted. The choice is stick together or try for self-
preservation.
In the classroom exercise,' two companies are negotiating prices
for their product, a peculator. A large class of students is divided into
groups A, B, and C. Within each group there are two companies,'Pulsar
Pepulator and Consolidated Pepulator, and four student-directors for each
company. The exercise is intended to see how well the two companies can
cooperate in coming up with a price that will maximize shareholder
profits.
The pepulator can be priced at $10, $20, or $30. If both companies
agree to price the product at $30, each will earn $11 million a year. 39
But if Pulsar Pepulator prices the product at $30 and Consolidated
Pepulator undercuts Pulsar at $20, Consolidated will make $18 million
while overpriced Pulsar earns only $2 million. So there is a motivation' for
short-term profits or a chance to "beat the other guy." The mathematics
work out such that cooperating at $30 will produce the most gain for both
companies because once a company gets stung by the other, both
companies drop their prices to $10, which provides only $5 million to
each.
Within the exercise there are actually three levels of interaction. The
first level is among the four directors who must agree on a price to present
to the other company. The second level is between the two companies who
will either agree or try to undercut each other's price. The third level is
among the whole class, now divided into groups A, B, and C.
In this exercise, cooperation is critical in the first level because the
four students are part of the same company. Those students must
cooperate to reach a price to present to the other company. At the second
level the choice between cooperation and competition is the focus of the
game. Cooperation yields mutually maximized gain ($11 million each)
while competition creates lopsided gain ($18 million versus $2 million).
The third level assesses how well group A did compared to groups B and
C in its ability to cooperate and maximize gain. The students realize after
the game is over how well or how poorly their game went compared to the
other two. There is another way to play the game.
38. STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, ERIC D. GREEN & FRANK E.A. SANDER, DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 21 (Supp. 1987).
39. The instructions state that anti-trust laws are suspended for the exercise. Id. at 22.
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Shapira and Madsen, in their study of children living on a kibbutz,'
shQwed the tremendous cooperation among the children of the kibbutz, but
they also found that kibbutz children were not without a competitive edge.
Within the kvutza, or sub-group, children worked together, setting aside
individual gain for group gain.
But each kvutza competed with the other kvutzas. So if Pulsar and
Consolidated were told that their results were not compared against each
other, but against groups B and C, the students in Pulsar and Consolidated
would be more likely to cooperate because they wanted to beat groups B
and C. Group A would be like a kvutza competing with two other kvutzas.
Law firms function along the same lines. Partners do not compete
with each other because they share each other's gain, like the kvutzas. But
law firms do compete with other law firms. The ideal is to make all law
firms feel like they are part of one group, the legal community, which is
competing with other groups, such as the business community or medical
community, to show the intelligence and efficiency of the legal
community:
The problem, which completes the circle from Kohlberg's
perspective, is that the legal profession has tried to get lawyers to change
the way they act for the greater good of the system or society but has been
unsuccessful. Landwehr's research suggests41 most lawyers' cognitive
framework may be stuck at a stage where they cannot look beyond the
status quo to see the future benefits derived from more cooperative dispute
resolution processes. Lawyers generally are not trained to see how
cooperation could benefit the legal community as a whole by reducing
transaction 'costs and increasing the number of cases handled and
improving public opinion.
William J. Goode suggests such a community of lawyers could
exist.42 According to Goode's theory, professionals such as lawyers are 'a
homogenous group which share a common set of values. Thus, lawyers
form a legal community within the larger community in which they
practice. Goode's theory is undercut, however, by the work of John P.
Heinz and Edward 0. Laumann, which indicates that urban bar
associations tend to be fragmented and culturally diverse.43 In addition,
legal pecialization may create a "community" of lawyers within a
40. Ariella Shapira & Millard C. Madsen, Between- and Within-Group Cooperation and
Competition Among Kibbutz and Non-Kibbutz Children, 10 DEV. PSYCHOL. 140 (1974).
41. Landwehr, supra note 33.
42. See Williani-J. Goode, Community Within a Cominnity: The Professions, 22 AM.
Soc. REv. 194 (1957).
43. JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982). See also, DONALD D. LANDON, COUNTRY LAWYERS, 119-
120 (1990).
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specialty, but such specialized communities represent insular units within
the whole bar. Formulating some kind of unitary notion of a "Legal
Community" to prom6te efficiency for its own gain is unlikely.'
The situation is not hopeless. Kohlberg notes that a Stage Four "law
and order orientation" individual can understand the rationale of the next
level, Stage Five. Kohlberg describes Stage Five as "the social contract,
legalistic orientation, generally with utilitarian overtones."' Moving the
individual's cognitive orientation from Stage Four to Stage Five, which
emphasizes changing the law for rational considerations, would enable
lawyers to understand why cooperation can provide greater gains. Such a
change will only com with some form of relearning and change in
motivation.
III. THE COOPERATIVE CouNTRY LAWYERS
In one context, lawyers have shown they can learn to change their
attitudes about settling disputes: rural communities. Much like the
children of rural Mexico or the kibbutz, the country lawyer works in an
interwoven social structure where clients are friends. When rural clients
have disputes, they typically do not seek lengthy litigation because it
means disapproval'from the community, which may view them as greedy
or hard-nosed.'
Donald D. Landon interviewed 201 small-town lawyers and 77
urban lawyers in Missouri for their perspectives on the adversary system
in those two settings. The language and reasoning used by the rural
lawyers he -spoke with mirrors the logic one would have to use on
Madsen's cooperation board.47 As one lawyer in a town of 4,000 said:
"Attorneys here get along well. That seems to reduce the volume of
litigation. No one is trying to make a 'loser' out of another lawyer by
44. See LANDON, supra note 43, at 4.
45. Landwehr, supra note 33, at 40 n.2 (citing LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE COGNITIVE
DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH TO MORAL EDUCATION, 50-51 (1978)).
46. Leonard Riskin says that litigation is viewed as a "shameful last resort" in parts of
the Orient as well. In the Confucian view:
[a] lawsuit symbolized the disruption of the natural harmony that was thought
to exist in human affairs. Law was backed by coercion, and therefore tainted
in the eyes of Confucianists. Their view was that the optimum resolution of
most disputes was to be achieved not by exercise of sovereign force but by
moral persuasion. Moreover, litigation led to litigiousness and to shameless
concern for one's own interest to the detriment of the interests of society.
Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 29 (1982) (citing Jerome
Alan Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1201
(1966)).
47. LANDON, supra note 43.
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converting a case into a win-lose situation."' A country practitione'r of
25 years pointed out why a more cooperative attitude prevails amongst
rural lawyers: "Lawyers protect each other in the country. They will need
each others' support over the years since in small .town practice the shoe
changes foot frequently. If you take advantage of a lawyer's lapses or
exploit something that reflects on him, he will get you the'next time. "41
The lawyers explained that they had to learn new ways to solve
disputes in their small community not provided in their traditional law
school advocacy training."0 A client coming to a lawyer following an
accident may not want to sue because the other driver is an acquaintance.
Likewise, the local attorneys work well together and do not try to take
advantage of one another. Any new attorney who steps out of line, say by
pushing for unnecessary discovery, gets swamped by every other attorney
with frivolous demands until he or she gets back into line."' This is much
like the peer pressure Madsen and Shapira observed among .the kibbutz
children when one child tried to manipulate the cooperation board for
greater individual gain.s
The two incentives for lawyers to act cooperatively are
community/peer acceptance and economic well-being. No one wants a
win-lose situation because over a prolonged period it will destroy
professional relationships. Those professional relationships usually involve
numerous personal relationships, such as membership on the school or
church board, children enrolled in school together or membership in the
local chamber of commerce. One lawyer said:
In a small town, you know everybody, their kinfolk and their
histories. The town is like a fabric - you know pretty well how the
-threads are woven together. You have a mental picture of how the
machinery of life operates here, and you get updated every morning
at coffee.sn
The small-town attorney .not oily finds friendly solutions, he
declines to take confrontational cases, much like the rural Mexican
children Kagan and Madsen observed. Confronting a community icon can
spell disaster, as one attorney told Landon, "Recently, I took on a medical
48. Id. at 140.
49. Id. at 143.
50. Country lawyers agree that law school does little to prepare students for dealing with
clients. One practitioner wrote: "Law school was about. learning the law, not about people.
Practice is about people." Joseph M. Wolczyk, In Search of a General Practitioner: Small
Town Solo Celebrating Family lies and Community Bonds, 5 COMPLEAT LAW. 24, 25(1988).
51. See LANDON, supra note 43, at 142.
52. See Shapira & Madsen, supra note 13.
53. LANDON, supra note 43, at 127.
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malpractice suit against a local doctor. It was a bad mistake. I think I'm
finished in this community. "5
Landon's interviews indicate the type of case is a critical factor in
the country lawyer's decision of whether to accept potential representation.
Ceitain types of cases can hurt the community and, in turn, the lawyer.
For example, one attorney noted the community's negative reaction to a
civil rights action: "I represented a family in a civil rights matter against
the school district. It was the worst mistake of my career! The community
held that against me for ten years!"' Similar attitudes were expressed
towards other controversial cases: "I'll never take on a sexual abuse case
in this town. It's one of these matters you quickly refer to an outside
attorney. 56
The method of avoidance among the country lawyer is simply to
refuse the case and refer the client to a lawyer in the next county.57 One
lawyer in a town of 3,000 explained:
The tradition in this town is to settle matters short of litigation. This
firm has been here for two generations and it has never been what
you might call "adversarial." If people want to fight, they go 25
miles north to for an attorney. There hasn't been a jury trial in
this town for two years.s
The country attorney's economic well-being may be the greater
incentive of the two for cooperative behavior. 9 Small-town lawyers make
their living off of a large number of individual cases. They get cases by
referral from Other work they have done and must dispose of matters
54. Id. at 137.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. This example further exemplifies why Kagan and Madsen's definition of irrational
avoidance, supra note 24 and accompanying text, is unsound. According to their principles,
an attorney who turns down possible economic gain from a client because he fears
confrontation is akin to the Mexican child who turns down the toy. Yet the attorney is
looking to the long-term effect, as might be the Mexican child.
Despite the immediate benefit to the community by avoiding such difficult litigation,
however, long-term injury may result from refusal to take these cases. A negligent doctor
may continue to practice, the school system, will keep violating civil rights or a defendant
will not get local counsel because of the nature of his crime. These are the types of cases
critics say must go to trial to establish public norms. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
58. LANDON, supra note 43, at 131.
59. While economics may be an incentive it is by no means the only reward, as one
lawyer in a small town in upstate New York explains: "My first criminal case was an arson.
I still have the thank you note the client's mother sent me. It meant more to me than the- fee I
got from the county." Wolczyk, supra note 50, at 25.
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quickly if they want to keep costs down.' The legal community,
therefore, has a vested interest in cooperation because it means faster
settlement and more gain for everyone.
The 77 urban lawyers interviewed expressed the impersonal nature
of practicing law. They litigated more6 and fought harder' because it
was not as likely they would face the same adversary. They did not spend
as much time giving personal advice as the country lawyersP because the
majority of urban clients are businesses." This difference in clientele is
an obstacle to reform. If urban lawyers do not face the same community
conflicts rural lawyers do, they will not be influenced by the same social
factors. They are, however, as easily influenced by education and money.
60. Despite the seemingly good-natured interaction among these attorneys, they agree
one needs good irial skills for two reasons: first, when a new attorney comes to town, the
established practitioners will take her to court on anything just to test her mettle; second, in a
small town reputation is important and one wants to be known as a tough advocate to get
more clients and as leverage to keep cases out of court. See LANDON, supra note 43, at 89-
90.
61. Fred H. Bartlit Jr., a Chicago trial lawyer, has a view of the role of settlement in
eases he handles that provides a striking contrast to the country lawyer's view:
Bartlit likes to do battle; in fact, he doesn't want any part of cases he thinks
might settle before trial. "Doing well in big cases requires a lot of hard work
and long hours. It's difficult to get yourself in the mental state if you basically
think the case is going away," he says. "Who would climb up those cliffs on
Normandy beach if they knew the war was going to be over anyway?"
• ..Still, if a client or the client's opponent wants to settle, Bartlit suggests
that another lawyer in the firm handle those discussions. "I don't think a good
trial lawyer can be a good negotiator," he explains. "I think cases should be
settled - but I'm not a settler."
EMILY Cou~lc, THE TRIAL LAWYERS 2 (1988).
62. The fact that attorneys feel they must be tough to impress the client is a by-product
of their law school training. One commentator has said: "The virtues of the adversary
system are so deeply engrained in the "American legal psyche that most lawyers do not
question it." Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, arid the Evolution of the Adversary System,
64 IND. L.J. 301, 301 (1989). "
Teachers in courses on trial advocacy do not emphasize that an all-out fight frequently
is not in the client's best interest. See, e.g., Kenney Hegland, Moral Dilemmas in Teaching
Trial Advocacy, 32 J. LEGAL EDUc. 69 (1982). Once out of school, public perception and the
practicing bar foster the belief that a good lawyer is a tough fighter. One judge has observed:
. . . [G]ood counselors are rarely honored for their achievements. While
stellar advocates are lionized by the profession .and the public, the best
counselors work in obscurity. [Citation omitted.] This circumstance "misleads
the public and attorneys into believing that the lawyer's only, or principal,
function is representation in the adversary process."
Edward D. Re, The Lawyer as Counselor and the Prevention of Litigation, 31 CATH. U. L.
REV. 685, 691 (1982).
Riskin,.says a lawyer may fear that by not acting tough, clients may no longer view
her as a "valiant champion. Supra note 46, at 49.
This fear is apparent in the rural bar as well. The country lawyers indicated that a
practitioner must establish the ability to try a case in order to earn public respect and as
leverage to settle the case. See supra note 60.
63. See LANDON, supra note 43, at 90.
64. HEINZ & LAUItANN, supra note 43, at 54.
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IV. WHY URBAN LAWYERS SHOULD (AND WILL) COOPERATE
The country lawyers behave cooperatively not only for themselves,
but for the good of the profession in their community.' They expressed
some of the cooperation ideals one would hope to pervade the legal
system." Because the vast majority of lawyers practice in urban
settings,67 however, it is unlikely this cooperative ideal will easily cross
the city lines.
One effective method of introducing the benefits of cooperative
negotiation to lawyers is through their education.' Chief Judge Edward
D. Re of the U.S. Court of International Trade says classes in counseling
65. Landon found that rural lawyers are also more likely than urban lawyers to be
concerned about the community's economic and social health because they recognize it
impacts on their practices:
They clearly understood the tie between the welfare of the community and
their own professional welfare. There was little reluctance to head - say - the
chamber of commerce committee wQrking to bring into the community a
Banquet Foods plant that would employ 160 people. Nor would there be any
doubt about involving themselves in a program to develop a new sewage waste
treatment plant that carries with it a generous infusion of federal dollars.
LANDON, supra note 43, at 92.
66. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
While evidence shows urban lawyers are more adversarial, some lawyers sense that
practitioners have confused rudeness with advocacy. One author points out that lawyers are
required by Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to be zealous advocates, so
no one should have anything to prove. See James L. Bush, Courtesy and Advocacy:
Thoughts of a Small Town Lawyer, 23 ARK. LAW. 3, 5 (Jan. 1989).
Another author says his colleagues think the public wants their lawyer to be mean and
ruthless in fighting their cause. But these attitudes are posing barriers to solving the
underlying disputes:
Fears that clients will question a lawyer's aggressiveness if the lawyer is not
mean, uncooperative and condescending are unfounded. If a client requires
that kind of behavior from its lawyer, do we want that client? Is this the kind
of system we want to promote? Is that the kind of system the public deserves?
Larry W. Hicks, Restoring Civility to the Practice of Law, 52 TEX. B.J. 586, 586 (1989).
67. Statistics show 88 percent of the practicing bar is located in metropolitan areas of
50,000 people or more, and the remaining 12 percent are in towns ranging in size from about
250 to under 50,000 people. See LANDON, supra note 43, at xvii, (citing BARBARA CURRAN,
LAWYER'S STATISTICAL REPORT 243 (1985)).
68. Riskin suggests that law school training, in fact, strips students of whatever
knowledge they may already have had of settling disputes in a nonadversarial way. See
Riskin supra note 46, at 43-51. To make his point, Riskin relates a story told by Kenney
Hegland.
Hegland had offered a hypothetical to his first-year Contracts class in which Buyer
was furious with Seller for sending only 999 widgets when the contract called for 1000.
Buyer had announced he was not going to accept any more widgets and would not pay for
those received. Hegland asked for a volunteer as to what Seller should do in the face of
Buyer's responses to the error. He wanted a discussion of the common law theories in this
setting that would allow Seller to force Buyer to pay. None of his students volunteered.
Then, he saw the hand of an eight-year-old boy who was visiting the class with his
mother, a student.
"Ok," Hegland said to the boy. "What would you say if you were the seller?"
"I'd say, 'I'm sorry.'"
Riskin, supra note 46, at 46, (citing Kenney Hegland, Why Teach Trial Advocacy? An Essay
on Never Ask Why, HUMANISTIC EDUCATION IN LAW, Monograph III, at 68-69 (1982)).
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are essential for a complete education in law:
The teaching of nonadversarial legal skills needs to be conducted with
the same thoroughness and effort which now characterize the teaching
of legal advocacy, and the adversary system. Interviewing,
counseling and negotiating skills are not. possessed in equal measure
by everyone, but they arf skills which can be learned. If law schools
were to include in the curriculum courses devoted to interviewing and
successful counseling, society could reap tremendous rewards in
terms of the number of disputes which could be avoided, settled and
kept out of court.69
No one would suggest such training should replace 'traditional
advocacy classes. But with nonadversarial legal skills, lawyers also can
consider a variety of solutions to incidental problems withifi the adversarial
contest. For example, Mahatma Gandhi, as a young lawyer, was surprised
by the benefits of mediation even after he had won a .judgment for his
client. The issue was how his client could collect the whole judgment.
Gandhi suggested installment payments to his client, because the defendant
could not afford to pay a lump sum. His client agreed:
[B]oth were happy over the result, and both rose in the public
estimation. My joy was boundless. I had learnt the true practice of
the law. I had learnt to find the better side of human nature and to
enter men's hearts. I realized that the true function of the lawyer was
to unite parties riven asunder.70
Regardless of prior "education in advocacy, urban lawyers are
sensitive to the needs of their clients, and businesses are expressing greater
interest in less-costly alternatives to solving disputes. For example, the
Center for Public Resources, which settles conflicts among businesses, was
started by Fortune 500 companies, not law firms. The Rand Corporation
and the National Institute for Dispute Resolution are also researching
better ways to solve civil disputes. 7
69. Re, supra note 62, at 696-97.
70. Riskin, supra note 46, at n.153 (citing MAHATMA GANDHI, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, THE
STORY OF MY EXPERIMENTS WITH TRUTH 168 (1948)).
71. STEVEN B. GOLDBERG, ERIC D. GREEN & FRANK E.A. SANDER, DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 5 (1985).
Some of the solutions those groups suggest could include completely eliminating
lawyers from the process. A study by Carol J. Greenhouse of a small Georgia town illustrates
the force and techniques a local church community can develop for solving disputes without
lawyers. CAROL J. GREENHOUSE, PRAYING FOR JUSTICE: FAITH, ORDER AND COMMUNITY
IN AN AMERICAN TOwN 110-122 (1986).
Landon also points out that some American-rural communities in Missouri get along
without any lawyers whatsoever, relying instead' on local businessmen for advice and their
own family networks or the church to settle disputes. One attorney, struggling to open a
practice in a town of 2,500, said the future looked bleak for him because the town hadn't had
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 7:2 1992]
Entrepreneurs have already established businesses to meet the need
for less expensive methods of dispute resolution. Large corporations,
including Standard Oil, American Can Co., Borden, TRW, Telecredit,
Texaco and Gillette are turning to organizations such as EnDispute,
Judicate Inc., Civicourt, and Washington Arbitration Services Inc. to work
out their disagreements.' Companies have changed internal structures to
reflect a new attitude. Xerox, for example, renamed its litigation
department the "dispute resolution group. "' Motorola Inc. has cut
litigation costs by 75 percent by requiring its in-house attorneys to seek an
alternative form of settlement before resorting to litigation.74
These developments, however, have made some of the nation's most
prominent law firms take notice of their clients' desires for more efficient
dispute resolution. The Center for Public Resources announced that 600
top corporations and almost 800 firms have signed the Center's "Law
Firm Policy Statement on Alternatives to Litigation. " ' The Center
estimates that avoiding court has saved companies more than $100 million
in 1991.76 The statement, developed by a national committee of litigators
and- corporate counsel, says the firms agree to advise their clients and
educate their attorneys about alternative dispute resolution." Former
American Bar Association president and committee member Robert D.
Raven said law firms must come to understand that alternative dispute
resolution is good for their business: "People may . . . assume that this
policy goes against a law firm's financial well being. . . . [T]he opposite
is true. In tough competitive times, law firms that can reduce clients' costs
and improve results through ADR are more apt to sustain long-term
relationships."'
The other end of the economic spectrum presents more troubling
a lawyer for 20 years and didn't seem to need one. Another attorney was the only one in a
town of 1,000 and said he spent most of his time as a mediator between the disputing parties
because no one could represent the other side. LANDON, supra note 43, at 131.
This adds some truth to the joke about the lonely lawyer with no work. When the
second lawyer came to town, they both had more work than they could handle!
72. See Richard Koenig, More Fins Turn to Private Courts to Avoid Long, Costly,
Legal Fights, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 1984, at 27. See also Jane Birnbaum & Morton D.
Sosland, Coning to Terms - Without Bringing the Lawyers, BUSINESS WEEK, April 13, 1992,
at 63, describing the success of Judicial Arbitration & Mediation Services, Inc. in Orange,
California. The organization expects to hear 14,000 cases this year with sales of $30 million,
up 25 percent from 1991.
73. Koenig, supra n.72 at 27.
74. See Michele Galen, Alice Cuneo & David Greising, Guilty! Too Many Lawyers and
Too Much Litigation. Here's a Better Way. BUSINESS WEEK, April 13, 1992, at 60.
75. Id. at 63. See also Rorie Sherman, Big Finns Join ADR Signathon, NAT'L L.J.,
Oct. 28, 1991, at 2.
76. See BUSINESS WEEK, supra note 74 at 63.
77. See Sherman, supra note 75.
78. Id.
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examples of the shortcomings of the litigation model. An increasing
number of small-business people and middle-class families who cannot
afford a lawyer or the cost of a full-blown trial are trying to represent
themselves in court. But the real concern is not that lawyers have priced
themselves out of that market; it is the number of people who are denied
'justice on potentially valid claims because of procedural errors that a
lawyer would have avoided.79
The other forces toward change have started to come from within
the legal system. Judges at the federal and state levels increasingly are
encouraging and mediating settlements.' And, in 1983, the American
Bar Association adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, in
which the role of a lawyer as an adversary was deemphasized.' The
ABA now describes the lawyer as a counselor, negotiator, and mediator.
V. CONCLUSION
Widespread use of cooperative settlements in the legal community
offers social and economic benefits that litigation does not provide. But
psychological studies demonstrate how competition is engrained in the
development of American children, even when competing prevents the
child from reaching his or her goal. Later, competition is reinforced in
American law schools. And further studies show that lawyers do not see
the benefits of considering new rules other than those they learned in law
school.
Educators and practitioners agree that law schools must introduce
classes in counseling and alternative dispute resolution into their programs.
People with legal problems do not always want a fight. Often, they just
want a solution. Lawyers need to know more techniques to find those
solutions.
Besides the social gains, such as preservation of resources, greater
client satisfaction and increased respect for the bar, lawyers may find it
makes their work more fulfilling.
From an economic view, if law schools do not train future lawyers
79. See Amy Stevens, Sef-Representation in Court Can Save Money, Bil Ofien at the
Cost of Success, WALL ST. J., June 3, 1991, at BI.
80. Some state courts have found success by requiring arbitration or mediation for
certain types of cases. See Randall Samborn, Courting Sohitions:" Rising Caseloads Spur
Judiciaries to Seek Solutions, NAT'L L.J., July 1, 1991, at 1. These, then, are two forms of
dispute resolution that law schools may have to include in advocacy training to fully prepare
their students for practice. In fact, a Colorado lawyer who fails to inform a client about
alternative dispute .resolution can be disciplined for a breach of ethical duties. See BUSINESS
WEEK, supra note 74 at 64.
81. See LANDON, supra note 43, at 124-25.
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in these techniques, developments suggest their livelihood may be in
jeopardy. Studies on small towns and the blossoming of dispute resolution
enterprises show* that if the public has to, or if businesses want to, they
can both get by without lawyers. Those who are paying to solve disputes
will continue to find more efficient techniques and the lawyers, if people
still want to use them, will have to comply.
